Greetings, Courtroom Fpreviousecreases!

Maybe The 9 are conscious that President Biden’s SCOTUS-reform fee is meeting subsequent week, Or even they’re simply not the political animals they’ve been made out to be, Neverthemuch less the Js fulld out the (presumably) penultimate week of OT20 with a trio Of choices revealing nodesk cross-aisle collaborations:

• In Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation (No. 20-543), the Courtroom—in an 6-3 choice by Justice Sotomightor, with Gorsuch, Thomas, and Kagan in dissent—held that Alaska Native Firms are “Indian tribes” for carry outs of the Indian Self-Detime periodination and Education Assist Act, and are subsequently eligible to acquire CARES Act aid Put aside by the Treasury Dehalfment.

• In Transunion LLC v. Ramirez (No. 20-297), the Courtroom—in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, with Justice Thomas main the liberals in dissent—held that solely plaintiffs Who’re concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation of the Truthful Credit rating Reporting Act have Article III standing To hunt damages beneath the statute.

• And in Hollyfrontier Cheyenne Refining v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n (No. 20-472), The majority held that a small refinery that has acquired a hardship exemption beneath the renewable gasoline program can get an “extension” of the exemption Even when tright here was a lapse in safety, wright hereas The feminine Justices dissented, led by Justice Barrett in her first dissenting opinion.

We’ll Try and make extra sense of these line-ups in our subsequent missive; for now, we convey you summaries of Wednesday’s circumstances.

Up first is Mahanoy Space School District v. B.L. (No. 20-255), wright here the Courtroom squarely addressed for The primary time the First Modification free-speech propers of a public-school scholar when talking (or tweeting or snap-chatting or no matter youngsters do These days) outdoorways Of school hours and off The varsity’s premises. The important premise that scholars take pleasure in some First Modification shieldions even on school flooring was established in Tinker v. Des Moines Unbiased School District (1969). However as subsequent circumstances have proven, schools, given their custodial or in loco parentis position, have extra license To handle scholar speech than The federal authorities ordinaryly has. That raises the question, although, how far does A school’s custodial carry out (and, with it, The varsity’s greater capability To handle speech) extend? As You’d possibly rename, in Morse v. Frederick (2007)—the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” case—the Courtroom held that A school might punish a scholar for uttering speech promoting drug use all by way of A school-sponsored exercise (the Olympic torch relay) Regardmuch less of The very Incontrovertible exactity that it was not on school flooring. Mahanoy takes the question a step further: Can A school regulate scholar speech That is fullly off campus and off school hours, albeit focused at a largely school viewers and A few school topic? The Courtroom’s reply? Maybe typinamey, but not this time.

This time containd B.L., a public extreme-school scholar, who had a trash week On The prime of her freshman yr when she Did not get her most properly-appreciated place on A private softball group and didn’t make the varsity cheermain squad, Regardmuch less of The very Incontrovertible exactity that some primary Getting into freshman did! Feeling salty af, B.L. took out her frustration Inside The regular method: While On the Cocoa Hut Collectively with her bff, she Snapchatted A photograph (snapped a chat?) depicting The two of them, center fingers raised, with the caption “F— school -u– softball –c- cheer —k everyfactor.” (She In exactity put all 4 letters together, but we’re afraid to; not Tons for fear of offending any of you Karens, but to primarytain away from a copyproper go well with by the ACLU, which Is not anyw promoting an F— everyfactor t-shirt.) As a Outcome of B.L. posted her message Inside the “story” An factor of Snapchat, it was solely viewable by her “good friend group” (a mere 250 people) and Only For twenty-4 hours. Neverthemuch less, A Sort of so-referred to as pals took a display shot and conagencyed the cheer coach. SMDH! The school then suspended B.L. from collaborating on the JV cheer group for a yr. Even although the JV squad is straight lame, B.L. sued and the district court enbe a part ofed the suspension and awarded her nominal damages. The Third Circuit afagencyed, hpreviousing thOn The varsity Could not regulate speech that occurred off-premises And out of doorways school hours.

The Supreme Courtroom afagencyed too, although it disagreed with the Third Circuit’s categorical hpreviousing. In an 8-1 ruling authored by Justice Breyer, with solely Justice Thomas in dissent, the Courtroom took a center floor. While public schools do have a particular curiosity in regulating some off-campus scholar speech, these particular purgo well withs Weren’t enough To beat B.L.’s curiosity in free expression right here. Justice Breyer recognized three options off-campus speech That alstrategies (although not On A daily basis) make it fullly different And fewer regulable than on-campus speech. First, A school will not often stand in loco parentis when a scholar converses off campus. Second, from The scholar’s perspective, if The varsity can regulate on-campus and off-campus speech, then tright here’s no alternative To converse freely In any respect. And finally, schools themselves have an curiosity in shielding expression when it takes place off campus (and is subsequently much less disruptive) beset off public schools are the “nurseries of democracy.” “Taken together,” Justice Breyer concluded, “these three options of a lot off-campus speech imply thOn the leemethod the First Modification grants To Highschools in mild of their particular traits is diminished.”

That regular might not Appear to be A very clear and administrable regular (as even Justice Breyer acknowledged), but A minimal of The majority utilized it right here, giving some further perception into The Sort of off-campus speech that shouldn’t be regulated. B.L.’s speech Did not contain options Which might place it outdoorways the First Modification’s odd shieldion. They Weren’t stopping phrases; and, Regardmuch less of The very Incontrovertible exactity that crude, they Weren’t obscene Inside the authorized sense. Pretty The fullly different, her statements mirrored criticism of The guidelines of a group of which B.L. types half——speech that, for an grpersonalup, would clearly be shielded. She didn’t goal particular people and implyt the speech Only for an viewers consisting of her private circle of Snapchat pals. The school had no oversight or custodial obligation for B.L. On the time of her speech, and wright hereas tright here was some short-term dialogue of the postings all by way of an algebra class At school (somefactor’s extra fascinating than the quadratic formulation, amiproper?), the doc Did not current any exact disruption Of school movements. And wright hereas tright here Could have been some on the cheer group, tright here was no proof of any critical decline in group morale. Briefly, The varsity had not proven enough particular considerations To permit it to punish B.L. for her off-campus speech.

Justice Alito, be a part ofed by Justice Gorsuch, penned a prolonged concurrence with a extra detailed framework for beneathstanding when speech by scholars outdoorways Of school Could be regulated by The varsity. Alito furtherly emphasised thOn the Courtroom’s opinion was not addressing school scholars at a public college, but grade-school scholars. While in settlement with the Courtroom’s opinion, he delved extra deeply and theoretinamey into the beneathpinnings of when schools practice in loco parentis authority over scholars, As a Outcome of of consent Of mom and father sending their youngsters To Highschool, and when The federal authorities (by way of The general public schools) should relinquish administration to the mom and father outdoorways Of school. Justice Alito seen the framework as deciding when mom and father have consented To a faculty’s (i.e., authorities’s) regulation of The scholar’s speech outdoorways Of school. He agreed thOn the Courtroom’s opinion struck The biggest stcapability On this case when making use of his theoretical framework.

Justice Thomas dissented. In his view, the conduct right here conventionally was of the type a public school might regulate by disciplining The scholar for disrespectful conduct subverting A school’s authority, Regardmuch less of time or location. He found this historic rule, wanting On the influence of speech, And by no implys its location, in 19^th Century precedent. He furtherly felt the Courtroom gave too little weight to the foreseeable capability of social media To Obtain people On The varsity Even when posted amethod from school.

Next up, in Cedar Level Nursery v. Hassid (No. 20-107), the Courtroom killed two progressive birds with one stone. In a 6-3 choice, the Courtroom held that a California regulation permitting labor unions to entry the property of agricultural employers So as to solicit help for unionization constitutes a per se bodily taking of property in violation of the Fifth Modification. A win for property propers and a loss for unionization efforts In a single fell swoop.

A authorities taking Of private property, requiring cost of simply compensation, Is ordinaryly a per se bodily taking (when compensation is owed Regardmuch less of its scope or burden) or an intangible regulatory taking (when prohibitions depart property intact but regulate the proprietor’s use, requiring the weighing Of factors To Search out out if the burden is influenceively a taking). The core question in Cedar Level was which Of these two buckets the California regulation fell into. The regulation currents union organizers a “proper to take entry” to an agricultural employer’s property for As a lot as three hours a day (an hour earlier than and after common working hours And by way of the lunch hour), 120 days a yr. Two agricultural corporations (Cedar Level, a strawberry grower, and Fowler Packing Co., a shipper of desk grapes and citrus) sued California’s Agricultural Labor Relations Board to enjoInside the regulation on The beneathside it was an uncompensated taking of an easement throughout their property. The district court and a divided Ninth Circuit rejected the declares, Neverthemuch less the Supreme Courtroom reversed.

Chief Justice Roberts, be a part ofed by the 5 fullly different conservative Justices, held thOn the regulation’s requirement of “entry” is a per se bodily taking, no fullly different than the condemnation of property For presidency use. The regulation Isn’t merely an financial regulation. It is akin to an easement and is a taking Even when it isn’t exactly an easement. The proper to exclude is a factorary facet of property possession, and proscribing that proper is a bodily restrictation on possession quantitying to a per se taking. In distinction to the decrease courts, the Courtroom althought it makes no distinction thOn the invasion of property propers Isn’t everlasting and regular 24/7 or Is merely for a restricted objective all by way of particular events. The Courtroom distinguished this regulation from ones it earlier thanhand upheld, shielding The biggest Useful out leaflets at A Buying center, Since the center was open to The general public and so the regulation regulating how The general public is deal withed was not the invasion of a property proper.

The Courtroom was not containd that its choice would inlegitimateate well being and safety regulations or fullly different transient intrusions. Remoted entry onto property, if improper, is dealt with by tort regulation. Regulated corporations are problemd permits, Which might impose circumstances on companies. Longstanding backfloor prohibitions on property are baked into widespread-regulation property propers And are not a taking. Property house proprietors, For event, might not work together in a nuisance or, According to the Fourth Modification, might Want to current entry to regulation enforcement officers.

While the Courtroom reinsaid the regulationgo well with, it Did not decide on the Type of compensation. It is unclear whether or not the district court will enbe a part of entry beneath the regulation (The one Type of aid requested by the plaintiffs) or permit it but require California to pay for that entry.

Justice Kavanaugh concurred, writing individually solely To elucidate how the Courtroom’s choice is According to its many yrs-previous choice in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1956), which upheld the Nationwide Labor Relations Act’s requirement that union organizers might enter agency property To converse with staff solely when “needed”—For event, if staff stay on agency property And Tright here Is not any fullly different affordable Technique of communication. The California regulation at problem goes properly past Babcock, Kavanaugh contended. For one factor, as defined Inside The majority opinion, Cedar Level’s and Fowler’s staff Do not stay on agency property, To permit them to be lobbied off the employers’ property.

Justice Breyer dissented, be a part ofed by Justices Sotomightor and Kagan. The dissenters noticed the regulation quite in A particular method. It bodily relevants nofactor. It financialally regulates the employer and its property propers. Under The conventional look at for financial regulation, it quantitys to a taking Provided thOn the regulation goes “too far” beneath a multi-problem look at balancing its financial influence with The Sort of enterprise and its “funding-backed expectations” As properly as to the character of The federal authoritiesal movement. This Sort of short-term and restricted invasion of property propers is inright herent In lots of types of financial regulation in trendy society with out quantitying to a taking, Not to mention a per se bodily taking.

Shifting on, in Collins v. Yellen (No. 19-422), the Courtroom refliped to A topic addressed in many current selections: Whether the construction of a currently created administrative agency violates the Structure and, In that case, what to do about it. This time, the agency wAs a Outcome of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), created Inside the aftime periodath of the 2008 housing disaster To handle, and if need be, function As a Outcome of the conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. And The exact problem was whether or not the FHFA’s construction violates the separation of powers Beset off it is led by a single director, removable by the President Only for set off. By a 7-2 vote, the Courtroom concluded that it does. Neverthemuch less it furtherly rebuffed the plaintiffs’ chosen Type of aid—unwinding A pair of of the FHFA’s most consequential movements—Instead remanding to the decrease courts To Search out out whether or not the plaintiffs have been entitled to any aid In any respect (strongly suggesting Inside The tactic thOn they Weren’t).

Congress created Fannie Mae in 1938 and Freddie Mac in 1970 to help the nation’s mortgage system. They’re each federally chartered, for-revenue corporations personaled by private sharehpreviousers. Their primary enterprise is shopping for mortgages, pooling them into mortgage-backed securities, After which promoting them to buyers. However this line Of labor was not so revenueable round 2008, when the housing bubble burst. Confronted with their potential insolvency, Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Restoration Act of 2008. It accredited the Treasury Dehalfment To buy Fannie and Freddie’s inventory if it deemed that prudent To shield markets. And it created the FHFA To handle The corporations and, in sure circumstances, step in As a Outcome of their conservator. Under the Restoration Act, the FHFA is led by a single director, appointed by the President and conagencyed by the Senate, who serves a 5-yr time period but Could be take awayd by the President “for set off.” Since 2008, the Agency has had three Senate-conagencyed directors and numerous appearing directors.

Just months after it was created, the FHFA’s director decided to step in as conservator for Fannie and Freddie. The subsequent day, Treasury practiced its authority To buy its inventory. Under inventory shopping for settlements, Treasury currentd every agency with substantial quantitys of capital, in commerce for most properly-appreciated shares with particular propers. Over The following yrs, the FHFA and Treasury amended these settlements a quantity of events, growing The quantity of funds Treasury made out tright here However in addition altering the formulation beneath which Frannie and Freddie paid dividends to Treasury. When The corporations’ monetary well being improved round 2013, the time durations Of these settlements proved to be very profitable for the U.S. authorities, ensuing Inside them paying billions of dollars in dividends to Treasury.

The measurement Of these costs irked Fannie and Freddie’s sharehpreviousers. So as that they sued the FHFA and its Director on two theories. First, they argued thOn the FHFA exceeded its statutory authority by amending The acquisition settlements. And second, they alleged that beset off the FHFA is led by a single director removable Only for set off, its construction is unconstitutional and all its movements inlegitimate. They requested for numerous Sorts of equidesk aid, chief amongst them an injunction directing Treasury to reflip to Fannie and Freddie a portion of the dividend costs. However the district court dismissed their statutory declare and granted abstract judgment to the FHFA on the constitutional one. A closely divided en banc Fifth Circuit later reversed the dismissal of the statutory declare, held thOn the agency’s construction was unconstitutional, but concluded thOn The relevant remedy was merely to sever the eradicating prohibition from The Reprimaryder of the Restoration Act, leaving All of the Agency’s selections intact. Given the signalificance of factors, the Courtroom granted cert.

Justice Alito, writing for a majority that fluctuated between six and nine, started with the sharehpreviousers’ statutory declare thOn the FHFA had exceeded its authority by amending the share settlements in Methods in which finally favored Treasury. Here, all nine members of the Courtroom agreed thOn the Restoration Act required dismissal. The Act explicitly bars courts from enbe a part ofing the agency relating to any movement that fell Contained in the scope of its authority as conservator. And the scope of its authority in that area was broad: It was empohave beend To behave in no matter method it concluded was in Definitely one of the biggest purgo well withs of both Fannie and Freddie or the FHFA (and therefore Most of the people the agency serves). As a Outcome of the grievance’s allegations established thOn the FHFA’s amendments of the settlements have been designaled to serve The general public inteReprimaryder of making sure Fannie and Freddie’s continued help of the mortgage market, they have been legitimate exercises of its conservatorship authority and unreviewable.

Justice Alito then fliped to the constitutional question relating to the FHFA’s construction. After brushing aside some difficult challenges to the sharehpreviousers’ standing To Increase this declare, he addressed the deserves. Writing for the Courtroom’s six conservatives, Justice Alito shortly held thOn the Courtroom’s choice in Seila Law LLC v. Shopper Financial Protection Bureau (2020) dictated the Outcome. Tright here, the Courtroom held that Congress Could not restrict the President’s power to take away the Director of The client Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to circumstances of inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance. Discovering no implyingful distinction between the carry outs and construction of the CFPB and the FHFA, Seila Law established that Congress might furtherly not prohibit eradicating of the FHFA’s director to eradicating for set off both.

However what Regarding the remedy? The sharehpreviousers requested the Courtroom to undo the amendments to The acquisition settlements and direct the reflip to Fannie and Freddie of dividend costs made beneath these amendments. However a majority of eight (all but Gorsuch) rejected this request for aid For two primary set offs. First, A lot of the related amendments have been made when the agency was helmed by an appearing director, who was not shielded by these (unconstitutional) eradicating provisions. And second, wright hereas later associated acts have been taken by non-appearing FHFA directors, All of the officers who led the FHFA have been appointed in A fullly constitutional method. True, the statute might have wrongly infringed the President’s authority to take away these directors, but that was no set off To deal with the movements they took Through their time in office as tainted and inlegitimate. That is To not say thOn the sharehpreviousers have been entitled to no aid; but Since the current of fullly different cures had not been adequately althought-about by the decrease courts, the Courtroom remanded to type these factors out.

Pretty a few Justices then penned separate concurrences and dissents on the constitutional factors. First, Justice Thomas emphasised the distinction between Appointments Clause circumstances and eradicating circumstances. When an officer is appointed in A style That Does not comport with the Structure, the officer lacks constitutional authority to practice the powers of the office. In the direction of this, an unconstitutional prohibition on the President’s authority to take away the officer Does not name into question the legitimateity of All of the officer’s acts. For these set offs, he “critinamey doubt[ed]” that on remand the sharehpreviousers Can be In a place to show that any related movement of the FHFA’s director was unregulationful. And absent an unregulationful act, they Weren’t entitled to any remedy.

Next was Justice Gorsuch’s flip. He agreed with everyfactor The majority said besides the remedy. Parting with The majority and Justice Thomas, he believed thOn tright here Ought to be no distinction between an officer being unconstitutionally insulated from eradicating and one Who’s unconstitutionally appointed. In each circumstances, the officer is exercising authoritiesal power with out constitutional authority. He would thus void everyfactor carried out by any director who was unconstitutionally Shielded from eradicating, Regardmuch less of whether or not that eradicating provision performed a causal position Inside the director’s movements.

Justice Kagan was up subsequent. Writing Only for herself, she agreed that Seila Law administrationled The Outcome. She furtherly agreed that Seila Law was entitled to stare decisis, Regardmuch less of The very Incontrovertible exactity that she continued to disagree with it (she had written the dissent in it, In any case, and was nonethemuch less of The identical thoughts). Nonethemuch less, she Did not truly be a part of that An factor of The majority’s opinion, beset off she didn’t like its description of what Seila Law had held and why. Then, be a part ofed by Justices Breyer and Sotomightor, she voiced her full settlement with the Courtroom’s remedial hpreviousing, going a bit past it to opine that she althought the decrease courts had already decided everyfactor they needed to So as To answer any remedial questions, so the litigation should hopefully come to A quick shut.

Lastly, it was Justice Sotomightor’s flip. Joined by Justice Breyer, she concluded tright here have been related variations between the CFPB and the FHFA, so Seila Law Did not decide the legitimateity of the Restoration Act’s prohibitions on eradicating of the latter’s director. Particularly, unlike the CFPB, which exercises vital authorities power and regulates private halfies, the FHFA exists exactly simply To oversee Fannie and Freddie. She would thus uphprevious the legitimateity of the Restoration Act’s eradicating prohibitions based mostly on previouser precedent, Dealing with enterprisees that practice restricted authorities authority, Which permits Congress to insulate their leaders considerably from eradicating.

Anfullly different! In the lone felony case of the week, Lange v. California (No. 20-18), the Courtroom was requested To Search out out whether or not the purgo well with of a fleeing misdeimplyor suspect On A daily basis qualifies as an “exigent circumstance” Which will simplyify a warrantmuch less entry. The Courtroom unanimously said no, although Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was solely be a part ofed in full by 5 fullly different simplyices (Justice Thomas be a part ofed Partially; Chief Justice Roberts, alongside with Justice Alito, solely concurred Inside the judgment). While The majority opinion acknowledged that misdeimplyor purgo well withs would typinamey Finish in circumstances enough to simplyify a warrantmuch less entry, it declined to undertake a categorical rule.

As ordinary in Fourth Modification circumstances, the beneathlying exactitys set the stage: Arthur Lange was thoughtsing his personal enterprise, driving his automotive wright hereas listening to loud music and honking his horn (having presumably already showd how the wheels and engine on the bus go), when an officer started to tail him. After following Lange for A quick time, the officer fliped on his overhead milds in an effort to signal Lange To tug over. By this time, however, Lange was solely A few hundred ft (a 4-seconds drive) from his house. Pretty than pull over, Lange pulled into his storage, which was hooked up to his house. The officer undertakeed Lange inside, questioned him, and noticed indicators that Lange had been consuming. A area sobriety look at and blood look at finally conagencyed that Lange was, certainly, hammered. He was charged with a misdeimplyor DUI and noise infrmovement, but moved to suppress all proof acquireed after the officer had entered his storage As a Outcome of the fruits of an impermissible warrantmuch less entry. State prosecutors opposed the movement, arguing thOn tright here was a categorical besidesion to the warrant requirement when an officer was in purgo well with of a suspected misdeimplyant. They gained and had the ruling afagencyed on attrmovement. After the Supreme Courtroom granted cert to resolve a circuit Chop up, the state abancarried outd its categorical-rule argument and the Courtroom appointed amicus counsel to defend it.

Writing for the Courtroom started, Justice Kagan started her evaluation by noting thOn the Courtroom had ordinaryly utilized the “exigent circumstances” besidesion to the warrant requirement on a case-by-case basis reflecting “The character of emergencies”—some circumstances might simplyify quick entry; some Will not. In deciding whether or not a categorical rule would nonethemuch less be relevant in this Sort of circumstance, Justice Kagan said no, For 3 principal set offs: First, the entry was Right into a suspect’s house—A spot deserving particular consideration beneath the Fourth Modification. Second, The fact that a misdeimplyor, Versus a felony, was believed to have occurred didn’t help a categorical rule. Alalthough some misdeimplyors might contain violence or fullly different critical misconduct, many encompassed fairly minor offenses like littering, noise infrmovements, and even “artificially colour[ing] any stay chicks [or] rabbits.” (Justice Kagan expressly declined to say whether or not the purgo well with of a fleeing felony suspect warrants a categorical besidesion.) Third, The fact thOn the misdeimplyor suspect fled didn’t primarily tip the scales in favor of per se warrantmuch less entry. A suspect can flee, the Courtroom said, “for innocuous set offs and in non-threatening strategies.” Here, For event, Lange’s house (and, perhaps importantly, his toilet) was simply seconds amethod when the officer flashed his milds, so it wasn’t clear that he was exactly fleeing from police when he pulled into his storage.

The Chief Justice concurred, be a part ofed by Justice Alito. He argued that precedent had already established a widespread (if not categorical) rule in favor of warrantmuch less entry following a misdeimplyant’s fmild. He acknowledged, however, thOn tright here might be an “unwidespread case” that deserved an besidesion to this widespread rule. Tright herefore, he would have remanded the case To imagine about whether or not Lange’s case wAs a Outcome of the besidesion to the rule, notably As a Outcome of tright here Did not exactly Seem like a “fmild” Inside The conventional sense. (Justice Kavanaugh wrote his personal concurrence arguing thOn tright here was little daymild between the Chief’s default rule and The majority’s. When a misdeimplyant truly flees from police, Tright here’ll virtually On A daily basis be exigent circumstances to simplyify a warrantmuch less entry.) The Chief furtherly focused on The smart difficulties that an officer Inside The sector would face in figuring out each whether or not the misconduct at problem was a misdeimplyor or a felony, and whether or not fullly different exigent circumstances Aside from fmild have been current.

Justice Thomas furtherly concurred, be a part ofed Partially by Justice Kavanaugh. He wrote individually to make two factors. First, wright hereas he agreed that a categorical rule on The idea of misdeimplyant fmild was improper, he famous fullly different categorical besidesions acknowledged Inside the widespread regulation. Second, he argued that Even when a Fourth Modification violation occurred in Lange’s case, the ensuing proof shouldn’t be excluded. This was not a case, he argued, wright here police work togetherd in any egregious conduct worthy of deterrence. Neverthemuch less it was a case wright here making use of the exclusionary rule would influenceively reward Lange for fleeing.

That’s a wrap for this week. Tright here are simply 5 circumstances reprimarying, which the Courtroom will presumably get by way of subsequent week. Till then, have An excellent weekend!

Tadhg and Dave